TO  BONDHOLDERS  OF 


fm 


THE  WABASH  SYSTEM  OF  RAILWAYS 
EAST  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI  RIVER. 


* 


> 


A 


W//4J^ 


To  Bondholders  of 

The  Wabash  System  of  Railways 

East  of  the  Mississippi  Riyer  : 


cD 

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After  three  and  a  half  years  of  costly  litigation, 
large  holders  of  all  the  various  classes  of  Wabash 
securities,  above  named,  have  agreed  to  a  plan  of  ad¬ 
justment  which,  while  it  proposes  some  concessions  of 
rights  which  might  possibly  be  enforced  by  a  continu¬ 
ance  of  the  litigation,  is  so  equitable  in  its  provisions 
that  we  believe  a  fair  consideration  of  the  reasons 
which  suggested  it  will  ensure  your  approval. 

It  is  undoubtedly  in  the  power  of  any  class  of  bond¬ 
holders  from  whom  a  concession  is  asked,  to  assert  its 
rights  and  thereby  prolong  litigation,  as  the  rights  of 
the  different  securities  are  so  conflicting  that  many 
questions  relating  thereto  can  only  be  determined  by 
judicial  decision,  which  through  appeals  from  Court  to 
Court  by  either  party  meeting  an  adverse  decision, 
would  result  in  almost  interminable  delay.  Such  delay 
is  certainly  to  be  deprecated,  and  therefore  it  is  not 
without  reason  in  this  /respect,  that  a  compromise  is 
suggested. 

First  mortgage  bondholders  claim,  that  even  though 
sectional  liens  only,  their  securities  are  good  for  their 
demands,  because  of  the  intrinsic  value  of  each  of  the 
different  properties  upon  which  they  are  secured,  but 
first  mortgage  bondholders  are  unable  to  enforce  the 
immediate  satisfaction  of  their  claims,  because  of  the 
care  with  which  Courts  always  rightfully  protect  the 


I  i  03567 


2 


interests  and  equities  of  underlying  securities ;  therefore 
it  is  not  permitted  them  to  say  effectively  “  let  the 
property  be  sold  to  satisfy  our  claims  ”  until  such 
interests  and  equities  as  are  claimed  have  been  ad¬ 
judicated. 

So  far  as  determination  of  equities  is  concerned,  all 
that  has  been  said  is  peitinent  and  applicable  to  the 
Second  Mortgages  as  well  as  the  First,  though  in 
consecutive  order.  From  the  fact  that  neither  the 
First  nor  the  Second  Mortgages  cover  as  an  entirety  the 
Wabash  system  (East  of  the  Mississippi  Fiver)  an 
element  of  uncertainty  is  introduced  into  the  otherwise 
complicated  question,  which  hitherto  has  prevented 
either  of  these  divisional  bonds  doing  more  than  to  ob¬ 
struct  reorganization. 

A  statistical  presentation  of  this  statement  may  be 
more  convincing  than  its  assertion.  The  First  and 
Second  Mortgages  cover  the  Wabash  property  in  sections 
as  follows  : 


NOV.  1st,  1887. 

Miles. 

1st  Mtge.  Bonds 
Funded  Debt 
and  Acc’d 

Interest. 

2d  Mtge.  Bonds 
Funded  Debt 
and  Acc’d 
Interest. 

Totals. 

TOLEDO  &  ILLINOIS') 

or  ^ . 

75  | 

$900,000 

136,830 

174,232 

$1,000,000 

175,052 

261,705 

TOLEDO  &  WABASH] 

LAKE  ERIE,  WAB.  &  ST.  L.) 

or  > . 

167 1 

1,211,062 

2,500,000 

380,363 

484,688 

1,436,757 

1,500,000 

262,353 

392,615 

$2,647,819 
or  $35,300 
per  mile. 

WABASH  &  WESTERN  j 

GREAT  WEST.  OF  1859 . 

180 

3,265,051 

2,496,000 

380,056 

481,454 

2,154,968 

2,500,000 

437,770 

656,079 

5,420,019 
or  $32,500 
per  mile. 

QUINCY  &  TOLEDO . . . 

33 

3,357,510 

500,000 

87,500 

85,685 

3,593,849 

6,951,359 
or  $38,600 
per  mile. 

673,285 

3 


Nov.  1st,  1887. 


ILLINOIS  &  SO.  IOWA 

DECATUR  &  E.  ST.  L. 

HANNIBAL  &  NAPLES 

CHICAGO  DIVISION . . . 

DETROIT  DIVISION... 


Miles. 


Total 


29 


109 


51 


262 


112 


1st  Mtge.  Bonds 

Funded  Debt 

and  Acc’d 

Interest. 

2d  Mtge.  Bonds 

Funded  Debt 

and  Ace’d 

Interest. 

Totals. 

$300,000 

43,066 

49,853 

392,919 

2,700,000 

467,250 

514,402 

1,018 


500,000 

000,000 

89,483 


4,500,000 

000,000 

554,250 


2,052,000 

000,000 

230,000 


miles. 


3,681,652 


589,483 


5,054,250 


2,282,000 


From  the  foregoing  table  it  will  be  seen  that  even  the 
First  Mortgages  have  in  themselves  no  principle  of 
cohesion  except  that  of  contiguity,  and  though  they 
cover  by  divisions  the  entire  property,  they  possess  no 
power  of  binding  it  together  as  a  whole,  while  the 
Seconds  have  not  even  the  advantage  of  attaching  to  all 
the  numerous  sections.  In  fact  the  portion  of  road 
upon  which  they  are  a  lien  is  less  in  mileage  than  that 
on  which  they  have  no  claim,  while  that  to  which  they 
do  attach  is  divided  into  three  sections,  and  the  lien  of 
each  mortgage  is  specifically  located  on  one  or  the  other 
of  the  three.  So  that  while  it  is  not  impossible  that 
the  property  mortgaged  in  these  three  sections  might 
be  worth  the  entire  lien  if  it  could  be  held  for  the  benefit 
of  all ,  yet  the  fact  is,  that  the  Ohio  Section,  which  in¬ 
cludes  the  Toledo  terminals  would  probably  show  a  sur¬ 
plus  in  case  of  sale  under  sectional  foreclosure,  which 
of  course  would  be  the  property  of  the  junior  mortgages, 
while  the  Indiana  and  Illinois  Sections,  charged  with  a 
lien  of  $32,500  per  mile  in  Indiana,  and  $38,600  per 


4 


mile  in  Illinois,  would  be  entirely  without  terminals, 
and  to  compete  for  business,  would  be  compelled  to  ex¬ 
tend  at  once  to  Toledo  and  St.  Louis. 

The  other  sections  would  also  be  compelled  to  build 
in  the  dissevered  link,  and  the  Wabash  Western  be¬ 
cause  of  the  disintegration  consequent  upon  such  sale, 
would  of  course  establish  other  Eastern  connections, 
and  thus,  three  roads  in  place  of  one,  would  be  the  in¬ 
evitable  outcome.  It  is  needless  to  say  how  disastrous 
to  all  any  such  result  would  be.  These  are  some  of 
the  reasons  why  concessions  are  asked  from  Second 
Mortgage  bondholders. 

The  reasons  why  consideration  for  the  junior  mort¬ 
gages  is  asked  are  briefly  as  follows  : 

Competent  legal  authorities  advise  us,  that  after  care¬ 
ful  examination  they  fail  to  find  any  equipment  what¬ 
ever  upon  which  the  old  First  and  Second  Mortgage 
bonds  are  a  lien.  The  existing  equipment  (outside  of 
that  owned  by  the  Pacific  Car  Trust)  was  purchased 
with  proceeds  of  junior  mortgage  bonds,  and  together 
with  whatever  has  been  acquired  by  the  Railway  Com¬ 
pany  since  the  creation  of  those  mortgages,  is  specifi¬ 
cally  covered  by  clauses  to  that  effect  in  them  con¬ 
tained.  The  junior  mortgages  also  cover  whatever  sur¬ 
plus  values  exist  in  the  terminal  properties,  inasmuch 
as  the  lien  of  the  different  Firsts  and  Seconds  does  not 
extend  beyond  the  section  on  which  they  are  each  def- 
initelv  located. 

The  old  Firsts  and  Seconds  therefore  might,  it  is  true, 
own  a  roadbed  and  its  superstructure,  without  equip¬ 
ment  or  terminals,  but  the  junior  bonds  would  own  the 
terminals,  because  of  the  value  in  them  over  and  above 
the  senior  bonds ;  together  with  the  equipment,  and 
as  these  are  the  only  means  whereby  the  roadbed  and 
superstructure  can  earn  an  income,  it  is  not  unjust  that 
they  should  in  this  case — which  is  an  unusual  one — 
have  consideration. 

The  Receiver’s  statements  which  show  the  earning 


o 


capacity  of  this  system  as  a  unit,  are  the  strongest 
argument  we  can  offer  to  urge  its  maintenance  in  that 
condition.  We  have  already  shown  what  disastrous 
competition  would  be  the  almost  certain  result  of  dis¬ 
integration,  and  it  is  needless  to  add  that  it  is  merely 
the  wildest  conjecture  for  any  one  to  assert  what  any 
portion  of  the  road  could  earn  under  such  circum¬ 
stances.  The  results  of  such  competition  in  the  past 
scarcely  encourage  engagement  in  such  an  experiment, 
yet  enforcement  of  the  literal  and  absolute  rights  of 
senior  bondholders  in  this  case  means  that  and  noth¬ 
ing  less. 

With  these  facts  in  view,  a  fair  analysis  of  the  pro¬ 
posed  plan  of  reorganization  will  also  show,  that  the  new 
mortgages  offer  a  much  safer  and  more  desirable  secur¬ 
ity,  than  can  be  claimed  for  the  old. 

The  present  divisional  mortgages  cover  lines  which 
owe  much  of  their  intrinsic  strength  to  the  union  of 
these  divisions,  and  to  the  harmonious  operation  of  the 
different  lines,  and  the  joint  use  of  the  important  termi¬ 
nals  at  Toledo,  Detroit,  Chicago,  St.  Louis  and  Hanni¬ 
bal. 

This  is  the  fundamental  argument  in  favor  of  mort¬ 
gages  which  cover  continuously  the  termini,  and  all  the 
lines  between.  The  traffic  reports  of  certain  portions  of 
the — so-called — main  lines,  and  of  divisions,  separated 
by  methods  of  bookkeeping — although  correct  accord¬ 
ing  to  the  method  adopted — are  untrustworthy  as  evi¬ 
dences  of  the  actual  earning  capacity  of  such  parts, 
unassisted  by  the  others. 

Without  the  aid  of  the  Chicago  Division  for  example, 
the  Decatur  and  East  St.  Louis  Branch  could  not  earn 
its  present  surplus ;  nor  could  the  Chicago  Division 
dispense  with  its  St.  Louis  connection.  Without  the 
Hannibal  and  Naples  and  the  Decatur  and  East  St. 
Louis,  the  main  line  from  Toledo  to  Meredosia  could 
not  count  upon  the  profits  allotted  to  it.  Each  part 
helps  support  a  part.  The  main  lines  contribute  to  the 


6 


divisions,  and  the  divisions  to  the  main  lines.  The 
large  terminal  charges  are  as  much  a  part  of  the  oper¬ 
ating  expenses  of  the  whole  system,  as  are  those  in¬ 
curred  in  the  movement  of  trains,  and  their  magnitude 
is  consequent  on  the  extent  of  the  system,  and  the 
aggregation  of  its  business. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  they  are  indivisible  equitably  in 
a  consolidated  system,  except  upon  some  principle 
which  will  pro  rate  expenses  incurred  for  the  benefit  of 
the  whole,  over  every  mile  of  road  operated.  Conse¬ 
quently  accounts  which  debit  to  one  division  the  entire 
rental  of  the  terminal  of  that  division  which  is  used  in 
common  with,  and  for  the  benefit  of  the  other  divisions, 
cannot  be  a  fair  test  of  the  earning  capacity  of  either. 
Hence  the  logic  which  concludes  that  figures  made  by 
order  of  the  Court,  merely  to  determine  approximately 
the  profits  of  divisions  which  in  operation  are  never 
divided,  is  utterly  unsound. 

By  way  of  illustration  :  Take  the  gross  earnings  of 
the  year  1886,  which  were  $12,886,460.77.  Of  this  the 
Chicago  Division  earned  $1,590,529.24  and  contributed 
to  the  main  lines  $832,802.17,  thus  furnishing  an  aggre¬ 
gate  of  $2,423,331.41.  Is  it  not  manifestly  unfair  to¬ 
wards  the  Chicago  Division,  to  charge  upon  that  alone 
the  rental  charges  at  Chicago,  which  amount  to  about 
$145,000  annually,  while  to  the  connecting  lines 
mutually  benefited  by  the  use  of  the  terminal,  no  charge 
is  made  ?  Nothing  can  be  more  delusive  than  such  an 
apportionment  of  expenses  and  profits. 

The  same  reasoning  applies  to  the  terminal  expenses 
charged  to  the  Hannibal  and  Naples,  a  road  51  miles  in 
length.  This  section  in  the  Receiver’s  statements  is 
made  to  bear  the  burden  of  all  the  terminal  expenses, 
which  should  be  distributed  over  the  lines  between 
Toledo  and  the  Mississippi  River. 

In  the  same  year  the  Detroit  Division  earned  $786,- 
362.57,  and  contributed  to  the  main  lines  $475,446.71, 
but  was  made  to  bear  the  entire  terminal  charge  at  De- 


7 


troit,  amounting  to  $68,556.96.  But  notwithstanding 
these  heavy  and  inequitable  rental  charges,  the  Chicago 
Division  actually  earned  in  1886  a  net  profit  of  $19 1,- 
558.04 ;  and  the  Detroit  Division  $99,202.22. 

If  the  rentals  had  been  fairlv  distributed,  both  divis- 
ions  would  have  earned  a  surplus  over  the  interest  on 
their  mortgage  bonds. 

In  1887,  the  Chicago  Division  earned  from  January 
1st  to  August  31st  a  net  profit  of  $71,937.91,  after  de¬ 
ducting  the  entire  amount  of  rental  and  sinking  fund 
for  the  eight  months.  This  was  a  gain  of  $36,705.96 
over  the  period  of  1886.  If  therefore,  for  the  four 
months  to  December  31,  1887,  this  Division  does  as 
well  as  it  did  in  1886,  the  net  profit  will  not  be  less 
than  $228,264,  or  $3,264  more  than  interest  on  its 
bonds,  notwithstanding  the  unjust  debit  to  it  of  all  ter¬ 
minal  charges. 

Up  to  September  30,  1887,  the  Detroit  Division  had 
earned  a  net  profit  of  $125,573.05,  thus  showing  in  nine 
months  a  considerable  surplus  over  interest  on  its 
bonded  debt,  with  three  months  of  earnings  yet  to  be 
added. 

In  the  plan  of  reorganization,  the  new  First  Mortgage 
not  only  embraces  these  divisional  lines,  but  it  is  also 
extended  over  that  part  of  the  Chicago  Terminals  now 
owned  by  the  Purchasing  Committee,  and  the  lines  of  the 
Wabash  Western.  Now,  as  the  lines  of  the  Wabash 
Western  will,  it  is  estimated,  show  a  surplus  of  at  least 
$600,000  this  year  over  all  fixed  charges — equal  to 
the  interest  on  $12,000,000  at  5% — and  as  the  prop¬ 
erty  of  the  Purchasing  Committee  in  the  Chicago 
Terminals  cannot  be  fairly  valued  at  less  than 
$2,000,000,  it  follows,  that  while  the  new  mortgage 
shows  a  small  increase  over  the  total  of  the  old 
mortgages,  the  additional  security  covered  thereby 
is  equal  to  $14,000,000  of  capitalized  value.  It  is 
obvious  that  such  a  mortgage  must  take  a  higher  rank 
than  the  old  First  Mortgages,  and  it  is  equally  ob- 


8 


vious  that  a  consolidation  which  will  strengthen  the 
lines  East  of  the  Mississippi  River  by  $600,000  of  net 
profit,  is  also  valuable  to  the  junior  mortgages,  and,  if 
possible,  should  be  secured. 

The  following  comparative  statement  of  debt  per  mile 
under  the  old  and  new  First  Mortgages  is  worthy  of 
consideration  : 

Debt  per  mile  1st  Mtges.  Main  Line  Wabash  (Old 

Mtges.),  excluding  St.  Louis  Div . $18,500 

Debt  per  mile  Jst  Mtge.  Main  Line  and  including 

entire  system  East  of  the  Miss.  River .  19,200 

Increase .  $700  pr.  mile. 

Value  of  additional  security  : 

Equipment,  say . $5,000,000 

(Chi.,  Tol.  &  St.  Louis)  Ter¬ 
minals,  say .  3,000,000 

- $8,000,000  $8,000  per  mile, 

and  the  equity  in  the  lines  West  of  the  Miss.  River. 

The  old  second  mortgages,  extending  in  divisions 
over  the  lines  in  Ohio,  Indiana  and  Illinois,  to  Mere- 
dosia  and  Naples  (422  miles),  amount  to  $7,185,574, 
inclusive  of  overdue  coupons.  The  new  mortgage  is 
increased  to  $14,000,000,  but  is  extended  over  596 
miles  of  additional  road,  and  over  all  the  terminal  prop- 
perties.  Of  this  $14,000,000,  the  sum  of  $3,000,000  is 
to  be  a  First  Mortgage  on  all  of  the  rolling  stock  now 
owned  by  the  New  York  and  Pacific  Car  Trust  Com¬ 
pany,  whether  in  possession  of  the  W abash  Western, 
or  Receiver  McNulta,  and  costing  originally  nearly 
$5,000,000.  The  issue  of  $3,000,000  for  this  purpose 
depends  upon  the  consent  of  the  owners  of  the  Car 
Trust  to  accept  the  bonds  in  exchange  for  their  certifi¬ 
cates.  If  not  accepted,  the  second  mortgage  will  be 
limited  to  $11,000,000  and  no  one  familiar  with  the 
property  mortgaged  can  consistently  deny  that  it  offers  a 
better  security  as  extended  over  1,018  miles  and  the 
terminals,  than  can  be  claimed  for  the  old  mortgages. 
This  comparison  may  safely  be  challenged. 


9 


If  the  East  Lines  remain  in  the  hands  of  the  Re¬ 
ceiver,  and  earn  as  much  in  the  ensuing  years  as  now 
claimed  for  them  in  1887,  the  Receiver  may  be  able 
to  pay  three  coupons  per  annum  on  the  First  Mortgages, 
and  as  there  are  now  four  overdue,  it  will  take  four 
years  to  pay  off  the  interest  arrears  of  the  First  Mort¬ 
gages.  This  will  bring  us  to  January  1,  1892,  at  which 
date  the  Second  Mortgage  bondholders  will  naturally 
expect  a  share  of  the  surplus  earnings,  but  even  now 
the  question  is  raised  by  the  junior  bondholders  as  to 
their  right  to  compensation  for  use  of  equipment 
covered  by  their  mortgages,  and  this  question  may  de¬ 
fer  the  satisfaction  of  the  First  Mortgage  interest  even 
longer  than  the  time  named  ;  but,  admitting  that  it  be 
all  paid  up  by  January,  1892,  seven  years  of  overdue 
coupons  on  the  Second  Mortgages  and  their  Funded 
Debt  bonds  will  have  accumulated  mean  while — that  is 
to  say,  49%  on  the  former,  and  42%  on  the  latter,  in 


round  numbers  amounting  to .  $2,820,000 

To  which  add  interest,  about  .  590,000 

And  principal  of  bonds .  ...  5,875,175  50 


Making  a  total  of . . .  $9,285,175  50 


Thus  at  the  beginning  of  the  year  1892,  with  a  Sec¬ 
ond  Mortgage  debt  .on  422  miles  of  about  $22,000 
per  mile,  and  subject  to  First  Mortgages  of  over  $16,- 
000  per  mile,  an  aggregate  debt  of  over  $38,000  per  mile  ; 
the  holders  of  Second  Mortgage  bonds  can  apply  to  the 
Court  for  arrears  of  interest.  Met  here  by  the  holders 
of  the  Consolidated  Mortgage  bonds  and  the  Sevens  of 
1879,  which  are  Second  Mortgages  also  on  some  of  the 
most  important  parts  of  the  lines  East  of  the  Missis¬ 
sippi  River,  and  with  claims  to  a  priority  of  lien  on  the 
bulk  of  the  rolling  stock,  what  will  be  the  conse¬ 
quences  V 

The  Purchasing  Committee  has  given  substantial  evi¬ 
dence  of  its  co-operation  in  carrying  out  this  plan — by 


10 


depositing  security  with  the  Central  Trust  Company  to 
provide  against  the  funding  of  First  Mortgage  interest, 
beyond  a  limited  amount,  in  a  very  remote  contingency  ; 
thus  providing  against  any  weakening  of  the  security 
now  held  by  the  junior  bondholders  ;  and  the  only  con¬ 
dition  of  their  co-operation  is,  that  assent  to  the  plan 
be  given  by  a  sufficient  amount  of  bonds  within  a  speci¬ 
fied  time.  All  details  will  appear  on  examination  of 
the  plan  proposed,  which  may  be  obtained  on  applica¬ 
tion  to  the  Central  Trust  Company,  54  Wall  street,  New 
York. 

The  Purchasing  Committee,  however,  reserves  the 
right  to  withdraw  at  any  time  if  satisfied  that  success 
is  improbable.  For  this  reason  the  time  in  wdiich 
bondholders  may  elect  as  to  what  they  will  do,  is  limited 
by  the  committees  to  January  20,  1888,  and  also,  in 
order  that  the  duties  which  will  devolve  upon  them 
when  the  anticipated  assent  is  obtained,  may  be 
deliberately  and  safely  performed,  and  the  delivery  of 
the  proposed  new  securities  be  delayed  no  longer  than 
is  absolutely  necessary. 

The  mortgages  securing  these  bonds  will,  for  the  pro¬ 
tection  of  bondholders,  be  drawn  with  the  utmost  care, 
under  the  auspices  of  this  committee,  acting  with  advice 
of  the  best  legal  authority. 

Let  bondholders  of  all  classes  weigh  the  advantages 
of  this  reorganization  plan  as  compared  with  a  proposed 
continuance  of  contention,  such  as  has  existed  for  the 
past  three  and  a  half  years.  It  has  been  framed  by 
representatives  of  all  classes  of  bondholders  and  ac¬ 
cepted  by  the  Purchasing  Committee  with  a  view  of 
meeting  bondholders  to  the  full  extent  of  their  means 
and  power. 

If  it  fails,  it  will  plunge  all  interests  into  a  conflict,  . 
the  end  of  which  no  one  can  foresee,  but  which  will 
certainly  be  to  the  loss  or  disadvantage  of  all  concerned. 


11 


Bondholders  are  not  subjected  to  any  expense  by 
reason  of  their  acceptance  of  the  proposed  plan,  all 
expenses  being  assumed  by  the  Purchasing  Committee. 

We  believe  that  a  large  majority  of  Wabash  bond¬ 
holders  are  extremely  desirous  that  some  settlement 
whereby  their  investments  will  be  amply  secured  and 
made  interest  paying,  shall  be  reached  without  further 
delay,  and  we  are  confident  that  the  proposed  plan, 
when  fully  comprehended,  will  meet  with  their  approval 
and  support. 

Any  further  information  relating  to  the  plan  will  be 
cheerfully  given  by  either  of  the  undersigned. 


Cyrus  J.  Lawrence, 

31  Broad  St. 

Henry  K.  McHarg, 

40  Wall  St. 
Thomas  B.  Atkins, 

2  Wall  St. 

New  York,  Dec.  21,  1887. 


i 

j  Of  the 
Y  Bondholders’ 
Committee. 


STATEMENT  OF  PAYMENTS  IN  CASH  ON  BONDS. 
WABASH,  ST.  LOUIS  &  PACIFIC  RAILWAY  CO. 
Re-Organization. 


First  Mortgage  Bonds. 

Interest. 

Old 

Bonds. 

Receive 

New 

Firsts. 

Receive 

Cash. 

Toledo  &  Illinois  R.  R . 

Lake  Erie,  Wabash  & 

Coupon  Feb.  1, 1886,  7%.. 

$1,000 

$l,00u 

$165  90 

St.  Louis  . 

Coupon  Feb.  1, 1886,  7%.. 

1,000 

1,000 

165  90 

Great  Western  of  Illinois  . . 

Coupon  Feb.  1,  1886,  7%.. 

1,000 

1,000 

165  90 

Decatur  &  East  St.  Louis. . . 

Coupon  Feb.  l,  1886,  7%.. 

1,000 

1,000 

165  90 

Illinois  &  Southern  Iowa. . . 

Coupon  Feb.  1, 1886,  6%.. 

1.000 

1,000 

142  20 

Quincy  &  Toledo . 

Coupon  May  1,  1886,  7%.. 
Coupon  Dec.  1, 1885,  7%.. 

1,000 

1,000 

146  30 

Hannibal  &  Naples . 

"Wabash  R.  R.  —  Chicago 

1,000 

1,000 

178  96% 

Division . 

Funded  Debt  Bonds  — 

Coupon  Jan.  1,  1886,  5%.. 

1,000 

1,000 

123  16% 

Toledo  &  Illinois . 

Funded  Debt  Bonds,  Lake 

Coupon  Feb.  1, 1886,  7%.. 

1,000 

1,000 

165  90 

Erie  &  Wab . 

Coupon  Feb.  1,1886,  7%. 

1,000 

1,000 

165  90 

12 


First  Mortgage  Bonds. 

Interest. 

Old 

Bonds. 

Receive 

New 

Firsts. 

Receive 

Cash. 

Funded  Debt  Bonds,  Great 
Western . 

Coupon  Feb.  1, 1886,  7 %. 

$1,000 

$1,000 

$165  90 

Funded  Debt  Bonds,  Illi¬ 
nois  &  Southern  Iowa. . . . 

Coupon  Feb.  1, 1886,  7%. 

Coupon  Feb.  l ,  1886,  6%. 

1,000 

1,000 

165  90 

Funded  Debt  Bonds,  Deca¬ 
tur  &  E.  St.  Louis . 

1,000 

1,000 

142  20 

Funded  Debt  Bonds,  Quin¬ 
cy  &  Toledo . 

Coupon  Feb.  1, 1886,  6%. 

1,000 

1,000 

142  20 

Scrip,  Toledo  &  Illinois . 

Interest  Feb.  1,  1886,  7%. 

1,000 

1,000 

164  32 % 

“  Lake  Erie,  Wab.  & 
St.  Louis . 

Interest  Feb.  1, 1886,  7%. 

1,000 

1,000 

164  32 % 

“  Gt.  Western  of  Ills  . . 

Interest  Feb.  1, 1886,  7%. 

1,000 

1,000 

164  32 % 

“  Illinois  &  Southern 
Iowa . 

Interest  Feb.  1,  1886,  7%. 

1,000 

1,000 

164  32% 

“  Decatur  &  East  St. 
Louis . 

Interest  Feb.  l,  1886,  6 %. 

1,000 

1,000 

140  85 

“  Quincy  &  Toledo . 

Interest  Feb.  1,  1886,  6%*. 

1,000 

1,000 

140  85 

[18132] 


